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Abstract
Sometimes, the consensus reaching process in group
decision making problems is a challenging task for the
people who are in charge of the final choice (usually
called experts). Firstly, the consensus is defined as a
convergent and iterative process. This implies that it is
necessary to keep the experts’ attention during the whole
process, even if it is longer than expected. Secondly,
some of the experts tend to be rigid and they do not
change their minds to help in the negotiation process
easily. In such a way, we propose a new feedback
mechanism that uses some gamification rules, designed
as a reward distribution system, in order to transform
that task into a game. This change can improve the
consensus reaching process in both situations: keeping
the experts’ attention on the process and motivating
those experts that should adjust their preferences.
1. Introduction
Solving group decision making problems has always
been an important task for the society. There are some
decisions that have to be made by a group of people
(usually called experts) instead of a single person [1]. In
such cases, if the motivations and interests of the group
members are not the same, it is necessary to establish
some rules to make a fair decision. Brexit is a clear
example of this [2]. Here, the British Parliament, which
is composed of 650 members having diverging positions
over Brexit, must choose the best option among several
ones such as the so-called Common Market 2.0 idea,
staying in the single market, staying in the customs
union, a no-deal Brexit, or Theresa May’s withdrawal
agreement [3].
In order to model the establishment of these rules,
several methods have been proposed from a directive to
a participatory range. Directive methods, as individual
dominance or minority influence, let one person or a
small group the control to make the decision for the rest
of the people. On the other hand, participatory methods,
as majority rules or consensus reaching processes [4],
usually involve all the group members to implement a
voting system or a negotiation procedure.
In this research, we are focused on the last method,
the consensus reaching process [4]. Usually, consensus
is defined as a convergent and iterative process to narrow
the people’s opinions. That is, a negotiation process
to make a consensual decision. In such a way, the
challenge has been the way to measure the consensus
level. Before 70s, consensus was considered as a
crisp measure, that is, total consensus if all the experts
have exactly the same opinions, and non-consensus
otherwise. However, with the use of fuzzy set theory
[5], the term soft consensus emerged to model partial
consensus scenarios [6]. In this way, if the experts
express their preferences by means of the fuzzy set
theory, it should be possible to measure the distance
between their individual opinions, and compute a soft
consensus measure to monitor the consensus state.
To manage these soft consensus reaching processes,
the problem is modeled as a group of two or more
experts, E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}, (m ≥ 2), and a
solution set of possible alternatives or options, X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn}, (n ≥ 2). Then, the experts have to
express their preferences and negotiate until they reach a
high enough consensus level. To do so, a system usually
acts as a moderator, computing every distance measure,
monitoring the process, and showing to the experts the
best way to converge with their preferences by sending
them some feedback information.
These consensus models are considered dynamic by
definition, because they are composed of several rounds
or iterations. However, some recent contributions have
gone one step further considering as dynamic each
component of the model [7]: dynamic experts, dynamic
alternatives, or dynamic preferences, for example. Even
so, some adaptive models consider dynamic ways to
compute the problem measures depending on the current
state of the consensus process [8, 9, 10]. Usually,
this state has been used to customize the feedback
information received by the experts.
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One of the main drawbacks of the current consensus
reaching models is the non-cooperative behaviour
management. Occasionally, some experts with a
different opinion from the majority preferences try to
hinder the agreement. If they do not consider the
feedback provided by the system, the consensus process
will not converge and the consensus level will never be
enough. Some authors have proposed new approaches
to deal with this situation under specific environments
[11], but there is still a research gap in the field.
A gamification-based approach may be useful
in such settings. Gamification can be defined
as the application of game mechanics outside the
entertainment context to solve problems or engage users
[12]. A possible example is to give the participant some
kind of reward (such as points, badges, or even virtual
money) [13]. In fact, the goal of the agents in a dynamic
setting can be modified through this kind of rewards
[14], and new economic models, based in game theory,
can be applied.
Under this scenario, the main objective of this
research is to present a new adaptive feedback
mechanism, which uses some gamification rules
implemented as a reward distribution system. In such a
way, it can be used not only to keep the experts’ attention
during the whole process, but also to motivate those
experts that should adjust their preferences to cooperate
in the negotiation process in order to reach a consensus
level as high as possible.
To do that, the document is organized in the
following way. Section 2 introduces some basic
aspects about consensus reaching processes for group
decision making, non-cooperative expert’s behaviour
and gamification rules. Section 3 describe the feedback
mechanism that we propose, including the new reward
distribution system. Section 4 shows an illustrative case
of use in a real world example. Finally, section 5 points
out some concluding remarks about the novelties and
performance of the proposal.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, some context information about
group decision making problems is presented. Section
2.1 introduces the classic consensus reaching process
for group decision making. Section 2.2 deals with the
non-cooperative experts’ behaviour. Finally, section 2.3
shows how the use of gamification rules could help in
consensus reaching process modelling.
Figure 1. A consensus reaching process for group
decision making.
2.1. Consensus reaching processes for group
decision making
Consensus reaching processes for group decision
making are composed of three steps (see Figure 1):
1. Elicitation of evaluations.
2. Consensus control process.
3. Feedback mechanism.
In the following three sub-subsections, we detail the
aforementioned three steps.
2.1.1. Elicitation of evaluations Fuzzy preference
relations are assumed to model the evaluations that the
experts provide. They are used in consideration of their
capacity to model decision processes and their ability to
fuse individual evaluations into group ones [6].
Definition 1 A fuzzy preference relationP on a finite set
X is a fuzzy set on the Cartesian product X × X , that
is, it is determined by means of a membership function
µP : X ×X → [0, 1] over the set X ×X .
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The n × n matrix P = (pij) is habitually used to
characterize a fuzzy preference relation P , being the
degree in which the option xi is preferred to the option
xj represented by pij = µP (xi, xj). In this setting,
the indifference between both options (xi ∼ xj) is
represented by pij = 0.5. If the option xi is entirely
preferred to the option xj , it is represented by pij = 1,
whereas if the option xi is preferred to the option xj
(xi  xj), it is represented by pij > 0.5. In addition, as
the elements of the main diagonal, pii, are not important
in such a context, we write them as ‘−’ [6].
2.1.2. Consensus control process The consensus
achieved among the experts must be calculated once all
of them have provided their evaluations. This is done
by following a strategy habitually used when the experts
utilize fuzzy preference relations that allow to calculate
three consensus degrees. The strategy is as follows [9]:
• Definition of a similarity matrix, SMkl =
(smklij ), for each pair of experts (e
k, el) as
follows:
smklij = 1− |pkij − plij | (1)
• Aggregation of the similarity matrices to
determine a consensus matrix, CM = (cmij).
This is done by using the arithmetic mean as
aggregation function φ:
cmij = φ(sm
kl
ij ) (2)
• Calculation of three consensus degrees:
1. Consensus degree on pairs of options,
cpij . This consensus degree represents the
agreement reached on the pair formed by the
options xi and xj . It is characterized by the
entry (i, j) of CM :
cpij = cmij (3)
2. Consensus degree on options, cai. This
consensus degree represents the agreement
reached on the option xi. Next expression
calculates it:
cai =
∑n
j=1;j 6=i(cpij + cpji)
2(n− 1) (4)
3. Consensus degree on the relation, cr.
This consensus degree represents the total
agreement reached. Next expression
calculates it:
cr =
∑n
i=1 cai
n
(5)
The consensus reaching process is controlled by the
consensus degree on the relation, cr. This is done by
contrasting the value of cr with a threshold, α ∈ [0, 1]
[8]. When cr ≥ α, we apply a selection process that
allows us to choose the best option for solving the group
decision making problem [15]. Otherwise, a feedback
mechanism is carried out with the aim of adjusting the
opinions expressed by the experts. The objective of this
is to increase cr. Furthermore, a maximum number of
rounds is habitually established to avoid the situation
in which the consensus degree on the relation does not
converge to α [16]. When this occurs, that is, the current
round is higher than the maximum number of rounds, we
must also apply the selection process [15].
2.1.3. Feedback mechanism As it has been noted, if
the obtained cr is lower than the established threshold,
a new round should start. However, before giving to
the experts the opportunity to change their minds in
order to modify the collective preference with their new
opinions, a feedback mechanism must be implemented.
The main objective of this feedback mechanism is
to automatically simulate the task carried out by a
moderator in a real consensus reaching scenario. That is,
it has to show to the experts the best way to narrow their
preferences from an impartial point of view. In this way,
it is necessary to compute other consensus measures,
called proximity measures, as the distance from each
individual opinion to the collective one [4].
Once the system has computed these proximity
measures, the challenge is to find the controversial
preferences and send to the experts the direction in
which they should change their minds if they want to
make their positions converge, improving the consensus
degree on the relation and making an agreement with a
particular solution.
2.2. Non-cooperative experts’ behaviour
In this subsection, we are going to summarize the
recent state of the art about non-cooperative behavior
management in consensus reaching processes. It is
important to note that non-cooperative experts are those
who do not change their preferences, even if the
moderator or the system itself ask them to do it for the
sake (convergence) of the process.
The first approach about consensus strategies
showing the differences between cooperative and
non-cooperative behavior was proposed by Sheng-Yuan
et al. in 2012 [17]. In 2013, Palomares et al. [11] started
a new research line in the field. In their first contribution,
the authors presented a fuzzy clustering approach to
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detect coalitions and non-cooperative behaviors. In such
a way, the identification of non-cooperative experts was
established as the very first step of the problem solving.
In 2015, Xuan-hua et al. [18] applied the previous
approach to multi-criteria large group emergency
decision scenarios. Moreover, the authors presented
a method to automatically characterize two important
parameters of a consensus reaching process: the
maximum number of rounds and the minimum threshold
for the achieved consensus level.
In 2016, Dong et al. [19] developed a new approach
to deal with non-cooperative behaviors. The novelty of
this method is the dynamic generation of the experts’
weights. In this paper, the authors consider that
in Palomares et al.’s approaches the management of
this kind of behaviors is excessively dependent on a
moderator and extremely demanding for him or her.
Finally, in 2018, some authors of previous papers
joined their efforts to present a new approach
based on social network analysis that manages the
non-cooperative behaviors in these environments [20].
2.3. Gamification
This subsection is devoted to explain the concept of
“gamification” and how the proposed method can take
advantage of game theory to increase the performance
of our feedback mechanism.
There is no exact definition for the term
gamification, as its use overlaps between many
fields of research [21]. Some authors define it as the
extrapolation of game mechanics out of the context of
entertainment to engage the user and solve problems
[12]. In fact, gamification has been successfully applied
in different fields, such as education, innovation, health,
or marketing, among many others, for example, using
gamification platforms that provide reward features in
the form of points, reputation, coupons, levels, badges,
or credits [13].
On the other hand, gamification proposes to use
game playing theories in various contexts to solve
difficult problems. For example, by adding a
human-in-the-loop in a machine learning method it is
possible to increase its performance. In [22], the authors
improved the results of an ant colony algorithm by
introducing humans playing a game into the process.
However, gamification is still an understudied area
in the context of decision systems [12]. Some examples
of the usefulness of its application may be in the
field of personnel selection. In [12], it was used to
obtain the characterization of the aspirant, analyzing
the decisions he or she makes playing a game, in
conjunction with a set of fuzzy rules. Related to this,
in [13], the authors proposed the decision criteria and
weights for deciding which (commercial) gamification
platform should be considered. These criteria include
the competitiveness of the product (sales, architecture,
function, performance), or the continuity of the service
(vendor stability, contract terms), among others. The
authors indicated that these weights can help to
understand what aspects should be considered for a
successful gamification.
A gamified effort feedback mechanism was
proposed in [23] to make decision support systems
easier to understand and used by non-experts, and to
drive decision makers to invest more effort into the
decision making process. Results demonstrated that the
effects of that feedback mechanism not only increased
motivation in humans, but that these effects are more
pronounced if the feedback is provided during each
decision task (and not after it). Moreover, the egoistic
behavior of agents in an interactive setting can be
influenced on the basis of incentives to modify the goals
of those agents, through the use of game theory, to
model new economic interactions [14].
With regard to the use of rewards, it is in one of
the branches of machine learning, the reinforcement
learning, where they can have more relevance [24].
This approach is based on how subjects make decisions
through rewards, positive or negative. The goal is to
maximize the action in the environment that produces
the most reward, but not the result of the action itself.
Examples of these methods may be the Monte Carlo
Tree Search methods, or the Q-learning algorithm.
However, the agent cannot spend this reward, for
example, to perform an action more exploratory (or
risky) than exploitative.
The proposal presented in this paper takes ideas from
the approaches explained above. On the one hand, the
concept of reward can be seen as a payoff for performing
an action, but, on the other hand, it can be seen as
gamification reward features (such as virtual money,
reputation or coupons), which can be spent later to add
more weight to a decision. In fact, different economic
models could be applied, such as Commodity Market
model or Bargaining model, in which providers and
consumers of a service can negotiate among themselves
to meet their objectives until they agree on a price [25].
3. A new feedback mechanism to increase
the experts’ experience using
gamification tools
Here, we describe our proposal for a new feedback
mechanism based on game theory, which is structured
into three steps (see Figure 2):
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Figure 2. Feedback mechanism based on game
theory.
1. Reward distribution system.
2. Controversial preferences searching.
3. Production of customized recommendations.
3.1. Reward distribution system
This system has been designed based on the
assumption that if the experts with a cooperative
behaviour (those that follow the advice provided by the
system in the previous stage) receive a kind of reward
that can be turned into some benefits in the next stage,
the consensus reaching task will be seen as a kind of
game by the experts. As gamification studies have
demonstrated (see Section 2.3), not only all the experts
will keep their attention focused on the problem but also
those with non-cooperative behaviour would be willing
to change their opinions to obtain the promised benefits.
In this particular case, the obtained rewards are
turned into a double benefit:
• To increase the individual weight in the
aggregation function that computes the collective
preference (see Section 3.2.1).
• To receive a fewer amount of recommendations
to change the individual preferences in the next
consensus round (see Section 3.2.2).
To accomplish this task, the reward distribution
system is structured into the following three steps:
1. If round = 1 → for each expert ek a reward
Rewk = 0.
2. If round > 1 → for each expert ek a
reward Rewk = Rewk + 1 is assigned
for each preference changed according to the
recommendations received in the previous round.
3. To normalize the reward vector Rew in order
to manage weights in the interval [0, 1] in the
following way:
NRewk = Rewk/max(Rew) (6)
After the reward distribution, each expert is included
according to his or her reward degree into one of these
three subsets:
• Very rewarded, Evr.
• Rewarded, Er.
• Non-rewarded, Enr.
The normalized reward vector NRew of each expert
is interpreted as a fuzzy subset. That is, NRewk ∈
[0, 1] symbolizes the reward degree assigned to the
expert ek. A fuzzy matching mechanism is then carried
out to include each expert into one of the subsets
(the parameters associated with the fuzzy matching
mechanism depend on the problem at hand). Each
subset of experts is a fuzzy set determined by a
membership function. In addition, two membership
thresholds, β1 and β2, are determined to distinguish
these three subsets.
3.2. Controversial preferences searching
To discover the controversial preferences (those with
low agreement), the first step consist in computing some
proximity measures. Secondly, we need to define the
searching strategy.
3.2.1. Computing proximity measures First, our
feedback mechanism computes the agreement achieved
between the individual evaluations and the group ones.
This is done by following the strategy encountered in
most of the existing approaches [4]:
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• A collective matrix, P c = (pcij), is determined by
aggregating the fuzzy preference relations given
by the experts:
pcij = Φ(p
1
ij , p
2
ij , . . . , p
m
ij ) (7)
As the experts have different reward degrees, the
aggregation function, Φ, must take into account
it. When weighted values are aggregated, the
procedure used consists usually in transform the
values under the weight to generate a new value.
The new values are then aggregated by means
of an aggregation function. In this research, the
weighted average is utilized to take into account
the reward degrees, which act as weights of the
evaluations:
pcij =
∑m
k=1NRew
k · pkij∑m
k=1NRew
k
(8)
• Using the collective matrix, the proximity
measures are computed as follows:
1. Proximity measure on pairs of options, ppkij .
It determines the similarity between the
evaluation expressed by the expert ek on a
pair of options (xi, xj) and the collective
one:
ppkij = 1− |pkij − pcij | (9)
2. Proximity measure on options, paki . It
determines the similarity between the
evaluation expressed by the expert ek on the
option xi and the collective one:
paki =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i (pp
k
ij + pp
k
ji)
2(n− 1) (10)
3. Proximity measure on the relation, prk. It
determines the global similarity between the
evaluations provided by the expert ek and
the collective one:
prk =
∑n
i=1 pa
k
i
n
(11)
3.2.2. Searching strategies Second, our feedback
mechanism identifies the preferences to be adjusted
with the purpose of improving the agreement in the
next round. This is done by using three strategies that
determine the preferences that the experts must adjust.
In other words, a different strategy is entailed by each
one of the previous subsets to discover the controversial
preferences.
1. Searching controversial preferences for
non-rewarded experts. Based on common sense,
this subset includes experts whose behaviour
is non-cooperative. To penalize this attitude,
more modifications should be suggested here.
As a consequence, this subset follows a strategy
trying to adjust the evaluations on all the pairs of
options having a low consensus. This is done in
the following way:
(a) The mean of all consensus degrees on pair
of options determines a threshold, γ1:
γ1 =
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
cpij)/(n
2 − n) (12)
(b) Identification of the pairs of options, PO,
having a consensus degree smaller than γ1:
PO = {(xi, xj) | cpij < γ1} (13)
(c) Identification of the controversial
evaluations, CEknr, that each expert
ek ∈ Enr must modify:
CEknr = PO (14)
2. Searching controversial preferences for rewarded
experts. It seems logical that the subset of
rewarded experts applies a strategy that reduces
the number of evaluations to be adjusted. This
is done by analyzing the agreement from the
perspective of the options instead of all the pairs
of options in disagreement. In other words, this
strategy only takes into account the evaluations on
the options having a low agreement. Furthermore,
for the identified options in disagreement, this
strategy requires that only the experts having
a proximity measure at the level of options
smaller than a proximity threshold δ1 adjust their
evaluations, whereas in the previous strategy all
the experts are suggested to adjust the identified
evaluations. For each expert, ek ∈ Er, this is done
as follows:
(a) The mean of the consensus degrees on
options determines a threshold, γ2:
γ2 =
n∑
i=1
cai/n (15)
(b) Identification of the options, O, to be
adjusted:
O = {xi | cai < γ2} (16)
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(c) Identification the pairs of options, PO, to be
adjusted:
PO = {(xi, xj) | xi ∈ O ∧ cpij < γ1}
(17)
(d) For each option xi ∈ O, we determine a
threshold, δ1, as follows:
δ1 =
m∑
k=1
paki /m, e
k ∈ Er (18)
(e) Identification of the controversial
evaluations, CEkr , that must be adjusted:
CEkr = {(xi, xj) ∈ PO | paki < δ1} (19)
3. Searching controversial preferences for very
rewarded experts. The subset Evr is composed
of the experts having a high reward degree.
Therefore, these experts do not need to
adjust excessively their opinions to get a
good evaluation (it is considered that they
have already changed their mind in the right
direction). As a consequence, the strategy applied
here should suggest fewer changes than the
previous two strategies to improve the consensus.
Concretely, for the pairs of options identified
in disagreement, this strategy only changes the
evaluations provided by the experts having a
proximity measure smaller than a proximity
threshold at the level of pair of options, δ2. For
each expert, ek ∈ Evr, this is done as follows:
(a) Identification of the options, O, to be
adjusted:
O = {xi | cai < γ2} (20)
(b) Identification of the pairs of options, PO, to
be adjusted:
PO = {(xi, xj) | xi ∈ O ∧ cpij < γ1}
(21)
(c) For each pair of options (xi, xj) ∈ PO, we
determine a threshold δ2, as follows:
δ2 =
m∑
k=1
ppkij/m, e
k ∈ Evr (22)
(d) Identification of the controversial
evaluations, CEkvr, that must be adjusted:
CEkvr = {(xi, xj) ∈ PO | paki < δ1∧
∧ ppkij < δ2}
(23)
3.3. Advising
Once the feedback mechanism identifies the
controversial evaluations, the next step consists in
indicating the right direction of the changes. As it is
done in other methods [8], our feedback mechanism
uses two direction rules. In such a way, for each
evaluation recognized as controversial, the feedback
mechanism introduced in this research proposes the
adjustment of the current evaluation as follows:
• The evaluation expressed by the expert ek on the
pair xi and xj have to be increased if pkij < p
c
ij .
• The evaluation expressed by the expert ek on the
pair xi and xj have to be decreased if pkij > p
c
ij .
In practice, the feedback mechanism proposed the
adjustment of the current evaluations by means of
two direction rules: (i) the symbol + means that this
evaluation have to be increased, and (ii) the symbol −
means that this evaluation have to be decreased.
In summary, experts with a high proximity to the
collective solution or experts very rewarded because
they have already changed their preferences according
to the system recommendations in previous rounds
should receive a light recommendation scheme, whereas
distant experts from the collective solution with
a non-cooperative behaviour will receive a harder
recommendation.
4. Case of use
In order to validate the concepts that we have
introduced in this research, we present a case of use
of the model. Let us suppose that a city (or a country)
government wants to invest some money by improving
some of its public services, which are: x1 = cleaning
services, x2 = health services, x3 = education services,
and x4 = security services. The idea is to distribute
the funding among the public services depending on the
necessities of each one of them. To accomplish this task,
four experts are inquired.
To solve this particular problem, we use the proposed
model. As there are to many intermediate calculations
and some space restrictions, firstly, we just focus on a
single intermediate consensus round to show each step
of the process. Then, we analyze the convergence of the
model by simulating different scenarios.
The proposed case of use is set up as follows:
the consensus threshold α = 0.75, the membership
thresholds (related to the rewards received), β1 and β2
are 0.65 and 0.45, respectively. Finally, the maximum
number of consensus rounds is 6.
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4.1. Consensus reaching process
4.1.1. Elicitation of evaluations In the first
discussion round, experts provide their initial preference
relations, but in the rest of rounds, they should change
them by following the system recommendations. We
present an intermediate round in which the experts have
previously received some advice. In this situation, the
experts provide their particular opinions by using the
following fuzzy preference relations:
P 1 =
(
− 0.8 0.8 0.8
0.2 − 0.6 0.7
0.3 0.4 − 0.6
0.3 0.3 0.4 −
)
P 2 =
(
− 0.0 0.2 0.2
1.0 − 0.7 0.8
0.8 0.3 − 0.4
0.9 0.2 0.6 −
)
P 3 =
(
− 0.4 0.0 0.2
0.6 − 0.1 0.1
1.0 0.9 − 0.4
0.9 1.0 0.6 −
)
P 4 =
(
− 0.4 0.2 0.2
0.6 − 0.1 0.1
0.9 0.9 − 0.4
0.8 0.8 0.6 −
)
4.1.2. Consensus control process The first step is
the computation of one similarity matrices for each pair
of experts (they are omitted). Then, we calculate the
consensus matrix CM , whose values can be used to
generate the consensus degrees at different levels:
1. Consensus degrees on pairs of options:
CM =
 − 0.60 0.60 0.700.60 − 0.62 0.55
0.63 0.62 − 1.00
0.68 0.52 1.00 −

2. Consensus degree on options:
ca1 = 0.64 ca2 = 0.58 ca3 = 0.75 ca4 = 0.74
3. Consensus degree on the relation:
cr = 0.68
As cr = 0.68 is lower than the established threshold
(α = 0.75), and the current consensus round is not the
last one, the system starts the feedback mechanism.
4.1.3. Feedback mechanism
• Rewards distribution system: During the
second and next consensus rounds, if the feedback
mechanism is activated, the reward distribution
system assigns a reward to those experts that
have followed the received recommendations (see
Section 3.1). The final and normalized reward
values obtained by using (6) are:
NRew1 = 0.70 NRew2 = 0.50
NRew3 = 0.40 NRew4 = 0.40
To compute the customized advice in a proper
way, the system takes into account the reward
received by each expert. Thus, they are included
into three different subsets (taking β1 and β2 as
reference):
Enr = {e3, e4} Er = {e2} Evr = {e1}
• Computing proximity measures: In the same
way that we have computed the consensus degree
at three different levels, we compute the proximity
measures. First, the collective fuzzy preference
relation is calculated by aggregating the four
individual fuzzy preference relations using (8).
Note that the rewards obtained in the previous
step, are used here. Then, P proximity measures
on pairs of options (9), proximity measures on
options (10) and proximity measures on the
relation (11) are obtained. These values are
omitted due to space restrictions.
• Identifying for controversial evaluations:
1. Identifying controversial evaluations for
non-rewarded experts:
(a) The threshold γ1 = 0.68.
(b) Pairs of options with a consensus
degree lower than γ1:
PO = {(x1, x2), (x1, x3), (x2, x1),
(x2, x3), (x2, x4), (x3, x1),
(x3, x2), (x4, x2)}
(c) Evaluations that should be modified by
experts e3 and e4:
CE3hc = PO
CE4hc = PO
2. Identifying controversial evaluations for
rewarded experts:
(a) The threshold γ2 = 0.68.
(b) Options whose consensus degree
should be higher:
O = {x1, x2}
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(c) Pair of options in disagreement:
PO = {(x1, x2), (x1, x3), (x2, x1),
(x2, x3), (x2, x4)}
(d) The threshold δ1 = 0.75 for the option
x1 and 0.73 for the option x2.
(e) Evaluations that should be modified by
the expert e2:
CE2c = {(x1, x2), (x1, x3), (x2, x1),
(x2, x3), (x2, x4)}
3. Identifying controversial evaluations for
very rewarded experts:
(a) Options with a consensus degree lower
than expected:
O = {x1, x2}
(b) Pair of options in disagreement:
PO = {(x1, x2), (x1, x3), (x2, x1),
(x2, x3), (x2, x4)}
(c) The average of the proximity measures
on pairs of options previously identified
is the threshold δ2.
(d) Evaluations to be modified by the
expert e1:
CE1hc = {(x1, x2), (x1, x3)}
• Advising: The feedback mechanism uses the
computed proximity measures to suggest the
modification of the current evaluations (see
Section 3.3). According to the direction rules, the
recommendations + mean that this expert should
increase these evaluations. On the other hand, the
recommendations − mean that this expert should
decrease these evaluations.
P 1 =
 – – == = =
= = =
= = =
P 2 =
 + + =– – –
= = =
= = =

P 3 =
 + + =– + +
– – =
= – =
P 4 =
 + + =– + +
– – =
= – =

4.2. Convergence analysis
In order to study the convergence of the model, we
have simulated several group decision making problems
with various sets of experts and options. If the experts
accept the recommendations proposed by the system,
we can observe that the consensus is growing up in
each discussion round (see Figure 3). Hence, the model
developed in this research allow to the experts to make
decisions with higher consensus.
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Figure 3. cr in successive discussion rounds.
5. Concluding remarks
In this research, a new feedback mechanism using
some gamification rules implemented as a reward
distribution system has been presented.
We have transformed the consensus reaching task
into a game for the experts by giving them some reward
if they obey the recommendations. The system can
be used not only to keep the experts’ attention during
the whole process but also to motivate those experts
that should adjust their preferences to cooperate in
the negotiation process in order to reach a consensus
level as high as possible. To do this, the system
implements three strategies to identify those preferences
that should be modified by the experts if they want
that the consensus increases. The strategies are
performed depending on the experts’ rewarding level by
considering the different computed values (consensus
degrees and proximity measures). The idea is that the
opinions of the most rewarded experts do not have to be
strongly changed (it is supposed that they have changed
their preferences enough in the previous rounds).
As future work, we think that the application of
mathematical rules of game theory to the current
consensus reaching processes could lead the experts to
make better decisions.
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